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-he DISTRIBUTION of JUDICIAL POWER
Between National and State Courts
By PHILIP B. KURLAND

FROM time to time during the past
fifteen years, I have appeared before gentlemen of your ilk in vain attempts to persuade you that you should act in accordance
with the best interests of my clients. My
singular lack of success has not discouraged
me from continuing to try to show you the
light of truth and justice. And so I appear
before you this morning once again in the
role of an advocate. For I am asking you
to give consideration to - and then to take
action on - the question of the appropriate
distribution of power between the national
and state courts.
The first point I wish to make is that the
question of distribution of judicial power
between the national and state governments
is almost entirely in the hands of the national legislature. With the single exception of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the Constitution of the United
States does not make any provision for a
division of function between the two judicial systems. There was some debate at the
Constitutional Convention on the question
whether there should be any federal courts

at all, other than the Supreme Court. But
that question was left to Congress for resolution, and, although Mr. Justice Story once
announced the view that all of the judicial
powers specified in Article III of the Constitution must be vested in federal courts,'
2
and some professors are still of that view,
Story's notion has long since been rejected
both by Congress and by the courts. In the
very first judiciary act,3 the act which authorized the creation of the federal courts,
only a small portion of the Article III
powers was vested in them. Moreover, not
only does Congress have power to say what
business shall be assigned to the federal
courts. It may also decide that the state
courts are to be charged with the effectuation of federal law. 4 Indeed the general
rule has developed that unless Congress
specifically confines jurisdiction to the federal courts, that jurisdiction is to be ex5
ercised by the state courts as well.

PHILIP B. KURLAND, professor of law at the University of Chicago, delivered this address before the
annual convention of the Conference of Chief Justices
in Pasadena, California, last August. The Conference
subsequently adopted a resolution directing its chairman to appoint a special committee to examine the
allocation of jurisdiction between the state and federal
courts now contained in Title 28 of the United States
Code, and directing that committee to make recommendations to the Conference for achieving a sound
and appropriate distribution of judicial power between the nation and the states.
1. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
2. My. colleague Professor Crosskey is one of those
who holds the view that Story's interpretation of Article III is the correct one. See 2 Crosskey, Politics and

the Constitution 808 et seq. (1953). Professor Henry
Hart is of the opinion that there is some constitutional minimum below which the federal courts' jurisdiction may not be reduced. See Hart, The Power of Con.
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953).
And Professor Pritchett believes that there is a constitutional barrier to reducing the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. See Pritchett, The Political Of.
fender and the Warren Court 65-69 (1958).
3. Act of September 24, 1789. And see Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923).
4. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947).
5. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876).

A Matter of State Concern
My second proposition is that the state
judiciaries have a direct interest in the con-
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tent of the federal judiciary acts, even
where the acts do not purport to assign
jurisdiction to state courts. A single example will suffice to make this point. Just a
few weeks ago, the president of the United
States signed into law a bill which increased
the minimal monetary amount required to
invoke jurisdiction in the federal district
courts from a sum in excess of $3,000 to a
sum exceeding $10,000, both with regard to
diversity of citizenship cases and federal
question cases. 6 That law also provides that
in measuring diversity of citizenship a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of the
state in which it maintains its principal place
of business as well as of the place of its incorporation.7 The law'also prohibits removal
from state to federal courts of workmen's

compensation cases. 8 The bill was sponsored
by the Judicial Conference of the United
States in order to relieve the federal courts
of a portion of their workload. 9 It was an
intermediate step toward the possible elimination of diversity jurisdiction in its entirety.'0 If, as suggested, this act will relieve
the federal courts of as much as 121% of
their diversity business, the effect on the
state courts will be to increase their burden
by some 3,000 cases per year. And the
heaviest increase will take place in those
metropolitan areas of the country where
the state courts are already floundering under a burden which they cannot now effectively carry. Should the Judicial Conference later recommend and Congress

6. 28 U. S. C. §1331 (a) has been amended to read:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U. S. C. §1332 (a) has been amended to read:
"(a) The district courts shall have original juris.
diction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between"(1) citizens of different States;
"(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof; and
"(3) citizens of different States and in which
foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are
additional parties."
7. 28 U. S. C. §1332 has also been amended by the ad-
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enact legislation eliminating diversity jurisdiction in its entirety, there will be an increase in the business of the state courts by
at least 23,000 cases per year." This is a
graphic but not a unique example of the
fact that one cannot properly consider the
problems of federal court jurisdiction in
isolation from the effect that changes in that
jurisdiction will have on the state judicial
systems. Yet I venture to say there was no
representation before the judiciary Cominittees of Congress by anyone who suggested that the states too had a vital interest
in the legislation.
Lest this statement mislead you as to my
own thinking on this subject, let me say
that I am heartily' in favor of the abolition
of the diversity jurisdiction. But I do not
believe that this major shift of business
from the federal to the state courts should
take place without a complete reallocation
of the country's judicial business. This reallocation requires a careful study of the
proper assignment of judicial power within
the nation. And my thesis for today is that
such a study should be undertaken not
only by those whose interest is solely that
of the federal judicial system, but rather
by a group which can also represent the interests of the state judiciaries. In short, I
suggest that it is this Conference of Chief
justices-working with the Judicial Conference of the United States, if possiblewhich should undertake to prepare a revision of the Judicial Code of the United

dition of paragraph

(c) :

"(4)
For purpose of this section and section 1441
of this title, a corporation shall be deemed a citizen
of any State by which it has been incorporated and
of the State where it has its principal place of bus.
iness."
8. 28 U. S. C. §1445 has been amended by the addition
of paragraph (c) :
"(c) A civil action in any State court arising un.
der the workmen's compensation laws of such State
may not be removed to any district court of the
United States."
9. See Annual Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 275 (1958).
10. Ibid.
11. The exact number for fiscal 1957 was 23,223, an increase of some 2,700 cases over the previous year. Id.
at 175.
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States for presentation to Congress. I can
assure you that such an undertaking could
have the assistance of major law schools of
the country and I expect that the American and state bar associations could also be
called upon for aid if that were thought
necessary or desirable.
But let me return, if I may, to the point
of my digression.
Reconsideration Long Overdue
My third point is that reconsideration of
the distribution of judicial power between
states and nation is both necessary and long
overdue.
We have it on high authority that:
"It is proper to inquire into the appropriateness of the existing distribution of
judicial power, just as the substance of law
is revised from time to time in response to
new needs. Whatever survives such an inquiry can only help to strengthen the judicial system. . . . The happy relations of
states to nations-our abiding political problem-is in no small measure dependent upon the wisdom with which the scope and
limits of the federal courts are determined."12
Indeed, it was thirty years ago when Professor Frankfurter, as he then was, noted
that there had not been a comprehensive
revision of the federal judicial code since
1875. What was true in 1928 remains true
in 1958: The distribution of function between the two sets of judiciaries remains
controlled by the concepts of eighty-odd
years ago. And as Mr. justice Frankfurter
wrote:

Interstate commerce was a narrow area, just
beginning to burgeon; foreign relations
were a comparatively minor aspect of governmental affairs; the income tax was not
so pervasive a feature of our lives; federal
criminal regulation was minimal; national
welfare legislation was practically unknown.
And distance between federal courts had
not yet evaporated in the face of the auto
and the plane. Whether we like it or not
the shift in the exercise of substantive governmental power from the states to the
nation has been a vast one. And the time
has come to adapt the judicial systems to
the realities of 1958.
I do not mean to suggest that there have
been no changes in the judicial code since
1875, for there certainly have. But that code
has developed like Topsy-it has just growed
-with the result that there is in it today
no rhyme and an inadequacy of reason.
Having pointed out that the problem of
allocation of judicial power between the
states and the nation is a legislative one,
that the states have a vital interest in this
legislative allocation, and that a reconsideration of the division has long been overdue,
I should like to call your attention to several-four to be exact-of the many problems which would be presented by such a
reconsideration.
Diversity and Federal Question

In 1875, the national government was
truly a government of limited functions.

I have already made reference to the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the
federal courts. It amounts to approximately
33 per cent of the business of those courts.
And yet since 1938 when Mr. Justice Brandeis announced the opinion for the Court
in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 14 the federal
courts in these cases have been vainly trying to simulate state courts presented with
the same questions. As the Supreme Court
said in Guaranty Trust v. York,15 in diversity cases the federal courts are to behave
as though they were part of the state court

12. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q.
499, 500 (1928).

13. Id. at 503.
14. 326, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
15. U. S. 99, 109-110 (1945).

"A division of judicial labor among different courts, particularly between a dual
system of federal and state courts, is especially subject to the shifting needs of' time
and circumstance. That the wisdom of 1875
is the exact measure of wisdom for today is
3
most unlikely."'
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system. This raises the question whether
there is any reason for making available to
litigants this simulated version of a state
court when the real thing is available to
them "across the street". My own opinion,
as I have already stated, is that little, if any,
reason exists today for the continuance of
diversity jurisdiction. Certainly the question ought to be examined and, I repeat,
examined not only by the Judicial Conference of the United States but also by
some group with a real interest in the state
judicial systems.
A second major question calling for
study, it seems to me, is whether the federal
question jurisdiction should remain in the
state courts. There are no statistics available to show how much of the state court
business is concerned with cases in which
the plaintiffs are relying on federally created rights as a basis for their claims. But
you know even better than I that those
cases add up to a very substantial number.
Are there adequate reasons for leaving these
cases for resolution by the state courts?
Two reasons which have been advanced
are weighty. As Professor Wechsler has told
us:
"This method has the virtue of preserving
for final resolution by state agencies any
issues in the case that turn upon state law;
the more numerous or weightier such state
ingredients, the more important it may be
to have them first determined by state
courts. Initial state adjudication also tends,
however, to give the states the final voice
on many federal questions, for review by
the Supreme Court, even when the parties
can afford it, can never function on a quan16
titative basis."
Another suggestion is, to me, no longer
persuasive. Mr. Justice Frankfurter to the

16. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision
of the Judicial Code, 13 Law and Contemp. Prob.
216, 218 (1948). Evidence of the truth of Professor
Wechsler's statement about the numerical insignifi.
cance of Supreme Court review of state cases may be
garnered from the annual surveys of the business of
the United States Supreme Court in the Harvard Law
Review.
17. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power be.
tween United States and State Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q.

February, 1959

contrary notwithstanding, I do not believe
that it is any longer possible that "the federal courts should be given only such
powers as are appropriate to a national
judiciary under a federal system, so limited
as to be capable of disposition by a relatively
7
small number of distinguished judges."'
The state courts ought not to be the dumping ground for litigation on the pretext of
maintaining an elite federal judiciary, since
time has demonstrated that whatever "elite"
quality the federal judiciary once attained
has long since been dissipated. I do not
mean to foreclose the question, however,
but only to ask for its re-examination-by
you.
Certification of Questions
No matter how these major issues are resolved there remains a third major problem involving the whole area of cooperation
between the two systems, a problem which
has never been adequately canvassed. However the federal question and diversity
jurisdictions are allocated there will always
be cases arising within one system which
will call for the application of rules of law
developed by the other. And often those
rules will be difficult to ascertain. Some
method of certification of questions from
one system to the other, such as is authorized by a Florida statute, 18 is certainly worth
consideration before its feasibility is rejected out of hand. Certainly the existent
methods of dealing with this problem have
proved both difficult and inefficient. 19
The fourth example which I should like
to mention is the one which is the most
exacerbating in the whole area of federalstate judicial relations: The power of a
court in one system to enjoin parties from

499, 530 (1928).
18. Fla. Stat. Ann. 25.031 (Supp. 1956); see Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court, and the
Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 Yale L. J. 187,
214 (1957).
19. See, e.g., the litigation culminating in Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951),
which was in the courts for almost a decade shuttling
back and forth between the two judicial systems.
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I have spoken of some of the issues which
must be the concern of those engaged in
determining the proper allocation of judi-

cial power between state and nation. I wish
now to speak for a moment about one subject which should not be the object of such
concern: I mean the scope of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. I speak
of this in part because of the recent furor
raised in Congress over this subject.
I start with an assumption in which, I
believe, you will readily indulge me. That
is that the Supreme Court has erred, seriously and frequently, in its decisions of recent terms. But I would remind you that
this is no novelty with reference to that
Court or any court. To me there are proper
and improper means for correcting the Supreme Court's errors, but a vindictive limitation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction
would be a grosser error than any which
the Court has committed. Insofar as it is
within the competence of Congress to rewrite the law which the Court has "erroneously" interpreted, such revision is a proper
way to correct judicial error. This was done,
it will be recalled, after the Court held insurance to be a business subject to the antitrust laws; 24 it was done again after the
Court held that the off-shore oil lands were
25
within federal rather than state control.
Insofar as the "error" was an error of constitutional construction rather than one
within the legislative domain, there are
still other means of correction. Constitutional amendment is available and has been
used to correct judicial error, as was the
26
case with the Income Tax Amendment.
Education of the people and the Court to
the error of its ways is still another corrective and we have seen this work as on the
question whether the federal government
had power to prohibit the shipment of articles manufactured by child labor in interstate commerce. 27 But to toy with the idea

20. 28 U. S. C. §2283.
21. 314 U. S. 118 (1941).
22. See Moore, Commentary on the United States
Judicial Code 400-402 (1949).
23. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power be.
tween United States and State Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q.
499, 506 (1928).
24. See United States v. South Eastern Underwriters
Assoc., 322 U. S. 533 (1944) ; Prudential Insurance

Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946).
25. See United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950);
United States v. California, 332 U. S. 191 (1947) ; 67
Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U. S. C. § 130 et seq.
26. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157
U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601 (1895) ; Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
27. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918)
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).

proceeding with litigation in the other. As
you know, the Judicial Code now provides
that:
"A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly provided
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
to protect or efaid of its jurisdiction, or
20
fectuate its judgments."
The very real question presented by this
language is whether the exceptions eat up
the rule. In 1941, the Supreme Court, in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 21 construed very narrowly the powers of the federal courts to enjoin proceedings in the
state courts. But the 1948 codification specifically rejected the Toucey rational 22 and,
in effect, reopened the whole question. I
will venture that this action, too, was taken
without any representations having been
made to Congress on behalf of the state
judicial systems. Here again, I submit, is
an area which warrants careful consideration by your organization.
The problems suggested here are but
some of the details which are regulated by
the Judicial Code of the United States. As
we have been told, problems such as these
"do not yield to settlement by formula.
Nor are they moral issues to be tested by
abiding truths. .

.

. We are here in the

domain of administrative effectiveness and
procedural adaptations, -matters not of
principle but of wise expediency." 23 And
I submit that the wisdom and experience
of the state judiciaries should be lent to
their solution.
Federal Appellate Jurisdiction
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of cutting down thet Court's appellate jurisdiction-especially in constitutional matters
-is
to toy with the destruction of that
organ of our governmental system which
has permitted the United States to survive
as a federation.
It was Mr. Justice Holmes who long ago
said that "the Union would be imperilled"
if the Court was deprived of its power to
declare "the laws of the several states" invalid.28 It was Harlan Fiske Stone, then Attorney General of the United States who
said:
"The most enlightened thinkers of the
day urge upon the world the submission of
international controversies and the interpretation of treaties to a permanent judicial tribunal, as a substitute for the arbitrament of arms. It would be a strange anomoly
if at this clay the settlement of differences
between our two systems of' government
should be withdrawn from the Supreme
Court and either left unsettled or settled
according to arbitrary determination of the
29
agencies of the respective governments."
But I really want to quote to you the words
of one who is perhaps closer to your own
thought on this subject. Senator Butler of
Maryland, sponsoring an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, had this
to say only four years ago:
"The final section which would remove
from Congress the power to impair in constitutional cases, the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, finds its principal
justification in the fact that Congress can
now withdraw jurisdiction as was done in
the cases of Ex parte McCardle,"the 1869
habeas corpus case with which I am sure
you are all familiar, and as was attempted
in Ex parte Yerger, an 1868 case which
prompted Congress to introduce a bill prohibiting the Supreme Court from considering any case which involved the validity of
the Reconstruction Acts and another pro-

28. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 296 (1920).
29. Stone, Law and Its Administration 138 (1924).
30. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Cornmittee of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on the Composition and Jurisdiction of the Su-
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hibiting judicial review of any acts of Congress. To the extent that appellate jurisdiction on constitutional questions is taken
away from the Supreme Court, decisions of
State and lower federal courts on such constitutional questions will have a finality and
stature which they do not now and never
were intended to possess under our judicial
system....
"To me that is a serious matter. It can
happen again. We may not foresee the circumstances under which it may happen, but
I do not believe we should place the American people under that hazard. We should
guarantee to them, by their Constitution,
protection of their basic right to be heard
hy the Supreme Court of the United States
in all cases arising under the Constitution,
and we should do what we can to preserve
our system of checks and balances. Both of
by this section
these ends would be served
30
of the joint resolution.
I should hope that you would indorse these
sentiments of Senator Butler.
In conclusion, I want to say this in support of my plea that you undertake to study
the federal judicial code and make suggestions to Congress for the proper distribution of judicial power. The centralization
of governmental power in this country has
come about primarily for three reasons. The
first is the necessity for central power resulting from the increased interdependence
of the people within this nation and within the world community. The second is the
unwarranted usurpation of power by the
federal authorities in many areas. The third
is the unwillingness of the states to shoulder
the responsibilities which are properly
theirs. 3 ' If the existent distribution of judicial power is unfortunate in many respects,
it is due in part to the failure of the state
judiciaries to make their voices heard on
the subject of the allocation. The responsibility is yours and I hope that you will
exercise it.

preme Court, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (June 23, 1954).
31. See Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10 Stanford L. Rev. 274, 280-285
(1958).
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